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Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty
DAVID N. ATKINSONt
INTRODUCTION
The behavior of any Justice may be in part determined by how he
perceives the Supreme Court's institutional role within the political
system. Justice Sherman Minton very definitely had trenchant views
on the institutional role of the Supreme Court in American government,
and on the function of the judge in the judicial process as well.
Justice Minton believed that the Supreme Court's role in American
government is circumscribed by the classic theory of the separation of
powers. Although he acknowledged that the Constitution prohibits the
executive and legislative branches from certain kinds of activities, he
was inclined to resolve questions as to the legitimacy of executive or
legislative acts in favor of their constitutionality. If he was satisfied
that the legislature had the power to act, he would not dispute the
wisdom of the legislation, absent an express prohibition in the Con-
stitution. In effect, he adhered to the view that the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches ought to be completely independent of one another.
He did not interpret the separation of powers to mean, in practice, that
the Constitution provided for the sharing of powers among the three
branches of government.' As one of his law clerks stated:
He drew a very tight line between the legislative branch and the
executive branch, and was inclined to feel that a court had no role to
play other than to sustain the authority of the other two branches in
any conflict situation.2
While on the Supreme Court, Justice Minton may have personally
agreed with his former Senate ally in the Court-packing fight, Justice
Hugo L. Black, more often than his voting record indicated. Occasion-
ally he expressed disapproval in his opinions of the litigants who bene-
fited from his votes.3 He remained nonetheless persuaded that the
paramount consideration in constitutional cases was the role of the
fB.A. 1962, J.D. 1965, M.A. 1966, Ph. D. 1969, University of Iowa; Associate Pro-
fessor of Political Science, 'University of Missouri-Kansas City.
I Questionnaire reply from one of justice Sherman Minton's law clerks.
2 Id. See also Justice Minton's dissenting opinions in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952), and in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
a Cf. G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 236-72 (1965). Schubert characterizes
Justice Minton's ideological commitments as "dogmatically conservative." Id. at 264-66.
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Supreme Court vis-i-vis the representative branches of government.'
One law clerk concluded:
The predominant view entertained by Justice Minton in con-
stitutional cases was that of judicial restraint. This applied in the
civil liberties area as well as in the area of economic and social legis-
lation. While he continued to be a New Deal liberal in his personal
views, and his votes as a Senator on much of the restrictive legis-
lation that grew out of the McCarthy era probably would not have
differed from those of Mr. Justice Black, just as they almost always
voted the same way while they were both Senators, Justice Minton
did not think that the Constitution should be interpreted to prohibit
the Congress from enacting contrary views into law. Of course, he
recognized that the Constitution imposed some litnts, but in general
he believed that the Congress should be allowed great leeway in
deciding what the law should be.5
As a member of a majority coalition in most major cases involving
alleged subversive activities, Justice Minton typified the dominant
mood within the Court. His behavior in this area of constitutional law
followed predictably from his conception of the Court's relationship
with the representative branches of government. He declined to re-
evaluate legislative policy choices if he was satisfied there was a sufficient
constitutional basis for national security legislation, a limitation he did
not read narrowly. As is known from Justice Burton's conference notes
from the decision in Communist Party of the U;,ited States v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Board,' Justice Minton telieved emphatically
that "Congress did not have to stand by"' if it perceived a Communist
threat to national security.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
Two frequently cited cases typify justice Minton's reaction to legis-
lative efforts within the states to control Communist activities. The first
of these cases, Adler v. Board of Education,' was decided in a time of
national difficulty. During the Korean war, persons accused of Com-
munist affiliations in the United States were often beset with a reversal
'Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton ,. law clerks.
5 Justice Harold H. Burton's Conference notes re Commurist Party of the United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd, 351 U.S. 115 (1956), undated (The Harold
H. Burton Papers, Library of Congress). justice Minton's views toward many national
security issues were not dissimilar from those of justice Burton. See Atkinson, American
Constitutionallsm Under Stress: Mr. Justice Burton's Response to National Security Is-
sues, 9 Hous. L. REv. 271 (1971).
8 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
7Burton Notes, supra note 5.
8 342 U.S. 485 (1952). But see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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of the presumption of innocence. On the other hand, there was testimony
from many sources indicating increased activities by the American
Communist Party and its sympathizers. Acting in response to popular
concern, antisubversion legislation was enacted in several states.
Amid division on the Court, Justice Minton consistently supported the
propriety of state antisubversion legislation against allegations that the
individual's rights of freedom of speech and due process of law were
being infringed.
In the second illustrative case, Pennsylvania v. Nelson,9 Justice
Minton concurred in Justice Reed's dissent, which denied that state
antisubversion legislation had been pre-empted by federal security legis-
lation. In both cases Justice Minton indicated his support for strong
governmental regulation over subversive elements within the country.
New Strands in the Mesh
In Adler, the constitutionality of the so-called Feinberg law'" was
at issue. The New York legislature had passed security legislation aimed
at alleged Communist infiltration in the public school system. Under
the provisions of that act, the Board of Regents for the State of New
York was empowered to make a list of subversive organizations.
Membership of a teacher employed in a public school in any of the
listed organizations constituted prima facie evidence of disqualification.
The New York Times had attacked the Feinberg law as a "blunder-
buss" bill and had charged that it incorporated in law the dubious propo-
sition that guilt can be determined by one's associations." The New
York Court of Appeals, however, took a contrary view, concluding that
the law reflected legitimate concern over who should have access to
the teaching profession. In effect, it viewed the enactment as
an effort by the Legislature to insert a new strand in the mesh by
which a screening process is accomplished in the selection of those
who teach the State's children.12
The majority further concluded there was no violation of due process
since the provisions of the statute were reasonably related to the harm
9 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
10 N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 3021-22 (McKinney 1953).
11 As the New York Times noted in an editorial:
Before the measure was finally approved at Albany this newspaper attacked it
as a "blunderbuss" bill and warned that the Legislature was "enacting into law
the untenable and illiberal theory of guilt by association." In the three years
since then we have seen no reason to alter that opinion.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1952, at 28, col. 1.
12 Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 489, 95 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1950).
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the legislature sought to prevent."
The constitutionality of the act was also defended as a rational
limitation on a privilege which in no way constituted a deprivation of
any right which could be properly claimed by the petitioner. Another
advocate of the right-privilege distinction was Holmes, who, in Mc-
Auliffe v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of New Bedford,'4 had writ-
ten: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."' 5 So it was with
public school teachers; the New York court's position was that public
employment is a privilege conditioned by any reasonable restrictions
the legislature may choose to enact. It is not, the argument went, a
right which can be exercised at one's own insistence.'
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Vinson, with
Justices Minton, Clark, Burton, Reed and Jackson, voted in conference
to affirm; Justices Douglas and Black urged that the Court reverse the
decision. Justice Frankfurter elected to pass.'
The Chief Justice assigned the case to Justice Minton, who began
drafting an opinion which adhered rather closely to the reasoning em-
ployed by the lower court. Justices Black and Douglas began to pre-
pare dissents. But shortly before either Justice I'Minton's opinion or
either of the dissents were circulated, justice Frankfurter moved to
marshal the Court on a jurisdictional disposition of the case and circu-
lated an eleven page memorandum among the Justices. The memoran-
dum, later reprinted as his dissenting opinion, N. as accompanied by
a short exhortation:
Narrow division on a serious question is always a matter of
regret and therefore, if fairly avoidable, to be avoided. There-
fore, I venture to ask careful consideration of what I really believe
to be the proper method of disposing of the case, however strong
may be the convictions as to the merits on either side of the what
was discussed at the Bar.'8
Justice Frankfurter believed the "proper method" whereby the case
should be disposed was to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds.
He took the position that the issues presented were abstract and specu-
13 301 N.Y. at 489-90, 95 N.E.2d at 811-12.
14 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
1 Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
"13See note 74 infra & text accompanying.
"Justice Sherman Minton's file re Adler v. Board of Education (The Sherman Min-
ton Papers, The Truman Library).
-s Letter from Felix Frankfurter to the Conference, Feb. 25, 1952 (The Sherman
Minton Papers, The Truman Library).
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lative because the Feinberg law had not yet caused the dismissal of any
teacher in the New York school system." The plaintiffs' standing
had been based on their interest under New York law in enjoining the
wasteful expenditure of funds by a municipal agency. However, Frank-
furter contended that the New York rule on standing to raise a con-
stitutional question was at variance with the. established practice of
the Supreme Court under article III. His effort proved unsuccessful
and the conference vote remained unchanged.
The petitioner's brief (prepared in part by Arthur Garfield Hays)
and the amicus brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union argued
that the individuals affected by the Feinberg law were denied rights
protected by the first amendment. justice Minton found this conten-
tion unpersuasive:
If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to
retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere .
... His freedom of choice between membership in the organiza-
tion and employment in the school system might be limited, but
not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense
that limitation is inherent in every choice.20
Although Justice Minton may have somewhat overstated the free-
dom of choice which, as a practical matter, is available to teachers, he
closely paralleled Holmes' reasoning in McAuliffe when he conceded
that such persons have the right under our law "to assemble, speak,
think, and believe as they will." But "it is equally clear that they have
no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms."2
Thus, Minton took the position that, although the state government
cannot deny the privilege of government employment in an arbitrary
manner, it can impose reasonable qualifications for that employment.
The question presented, then, was whether loyalty was a proper
criterion for government employment. As has been noted by one of
justice Minton's clerks, the answer might depend on the nature of the
employment involved.22 Justice Minton's answer in the instant case
was emphatic:
19 Inasmuch as Justice Frankfurter did not believe the issues had ripened into an
actual case or controversy, he concluded the Court was in effect being asked to offer an
advisory opinion. His intense aversion to advisory opinions was in large part premised
on historical Supreme Court practice, the need for an actual injury to assist in the formu-
lation of precise issues, and the value of oral argument on those issues. See Frankfurter,
A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HAgv. L. REv. 1002 (1924).
20342 U.S. 492-93.
21 d at 492.
22 Memorandum re Adler v. Board of Education, undated (The Sherman Minton
Papers, The Truman Library).
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A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes
the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they
live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the
integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the
right and the duty to screen the officials, teacher;, and employees
as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a
part of ordered society cannot be doubted.3
Assuming, as the Court did, that loyalty is a proper criterion for
employment, the hard question in Adler was whether membership in a
subversive organization was material evidence of disloyalty. In answer
to that question, Justice Minton said, "from time immemorial, one's
reputation has been determined in part by the comp-ny he keeps."'"
Justice Douglas in dissent accused the majority of determining
guilt by association.2" A passage in one of Justice Minton's preliminary
drafts, later deleted, directly addresses this charge.
This is not guilt by association. No one is charged with any
criminal offense. Guilt in a criminal sense is personal; but as surely
as guilt is personal, association is material to the inquiry here.
Association, when shown to be with organizations that advocate the
overthrow of government by force or violence, is a material con-
sideration of fitness and qualification for employment in the school
system.
26
Moreover, the Feinberg law was applicable only to persons who
had knowledge of the subversive purposes for which the organization
they had joined was formed. It is perhaps not unreasonable to rebut-
tably presume that persons who join organizations with knowledge of
organizational activities sympathize, at least to some extent, with those
activities. As a further precaution against adminis rative impropriety,
the act guaranteed a hearing where the presumption of disqualification
could be rebutted by the introduction of substantial contrary evidence.
The preamble to the Feinberg law contained an elaborate allegation
of Communist subversion in the New York public school system. The
American Civil Liberties Union in an amicus brief consequently main-
23 342 U.S. at 493.
24 Id.
251342 U.S. at 508-09.
26 Justice Sherman Minton's file re Adler v. Board of Edacation (The Sherman
Minton Papers, The Truman Library).
27 As revealed in his notes on the case, Minton understood te Act to provide that,
if a teacher did not resign his position within ten days following the publication of the
list of subversive organizations, evidence of membership prior to the date of publication
was deemed presumptive evidence of disqualification to teach.
19741
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tained that the preamble constituted a bill of attainder.28 However, as
his notes indicate, Justice Minton was never in the least impressed with
this argument. The preamble, of course, enacted nothing and was in
no way a part of New York's education law. Justice Minton's opinion
thus supported the exercise of state power, and denied that the Con-
stitution was a barrier to the exercise of state power to control internal
subversion.
The calculus of the competing interests presented in Adler likewise
concerned the dissenters. It should be recognized that Justice Douglas
was concerned with the dangers "inherent" in subversive elements within
public school faculties. In the second version of his dissent (deleted
in the final draft), he indicated a possible ground for the discharge of
subversive teachers.
The function of the teacher is to explore to the edges of
problems, to push inquiry to the horizon, to search for truth
unfettered by dogma. It may be that a Communist who is teaching
in some fields would be unable to meet this high standard. It may
be that her indoctrination in the conspiratorial role of the Comintern
would cause her to pervert some subjects. In that case I think it
clear that she could be discharged or disciplined for failing to
meet appropriate professional standards."
Justice Douglas emphasized in his early drafts that the Feinberg law did
not employ the test so stated nor did it condemn teachers on the basis
of disloyal acts. Instead, he believed it worked on the simple and
dangerous premise of guilt by association.
There was yet another deletion in Justice Douglas's second circu-
lated dissent (which was his published opinion). His first dissent related
the rising importance of the public school to the disintegration of the
family. As the institutional importance of the family has declined, the
"burden carried by the school has increased proportionately." He there-
fore thought it especially important that the guarantee of the first amend-
ment be safeguarded in the schools."0
Federal Pre-emption
State security regulation was also at issue in Pennsylvania v.
28 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
29 Letter from William 0. Douglas to the Conference, Mar. 1, 1952 (The Sherman
Minton Papers, The Truman Library).
30 Letter from William 0. Douglas to the Conference, Feb. 29, 1952 (The Sherman
Minton Papers, The Truman Library).
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Nelson," where the respondent's state court conviction was reversed.32
Respondent was prosecuted under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act which
the Supreme Court held had been superseded by federal legislation,
including the Smith Act of 1940" and the Inter-nal Security Act of
1950.34
In sustaining a decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
to reverse Nelson's conviction, the majority, per Chief Justice Warren,
discussed at length the "tests of supersession." TLie Court held, first,
that the federal regulatory scheme was sufficiently pervasive to pre-
empt state legislation. According to the Court the broad congressional
enactments covering subversive activities indicated a corresponding
congressional intent to completely occupy the field. The Court also
held that federal interest in this area was dominant enough to pre-empt
corresponding state enforcement. Seditious conduct was an indispen-
sable matter of national concern; it was therefore not a proper subject
for the exercise of state police power. The majority argued that the
Pennsylvania legislation, if enforced by the state, presented the prob-
ability of administrative conflict with the agencies charged with super-
vising the federal security programs.3" The Court found an analogous
situation in labor-management relations, where the Court had pre-
viously warned of the rise of diverse and confusing tribunals and proce-
dures sometimes inherent in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction.
Justices Minton and Burton joined Justice Reed's dissent, which
voiced thorough disagreement with each of the "te,..ts of supersession"
adopted by the majority. In the first place, the dissenters remained
unpersuaded that federal antisubversive legislation was indeed so
pervasive it occupied the field to the exclusion of state regulation. The
"occupancy of the field" concept was derived from the old commerce
clause cases, but there the concept had successfully prevented the erection
of local trade barriers inimical to a national commerce3 In contrast,
the federal sedition laws were criminal statutes. Certain designated
acts were subject to punishment prescribed by the federal government.
There was thus no "general congressional regulatory scheme" which
3 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
32 See generally J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SuPREmE CouRT AS ?TINAL AinrnI IN FED-
ERAL-STATE RELATIONS, 1789-1957, at 190-91 (1958) ; Hunt, Stat Control of Sedition:
The Smith Act as the Supreme Law of the Land, 41 MINN. L. REv. 287 (1957).
33 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
34 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (1970).
35 350 U.S. at 514.
8 See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
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the states could upset.17 The assumption of federal dominance sufficient
to preclude state regulation was also questioned. Under the long estab-
lished doctrine of dual citizenship, Americans are citizens both of the
United States and of the respective states wherein they reside. The
duty to protect the rights and liberties of citizenship, including protec-
tion from seditious disorder, rests with both the states and the federal
government. And since both the states and the federal government
share in the effort to protect themselves and their citizens from disrup-
tive influences, it is anomalous to speak of the dominance of the federal
government. Their interests are concurrent and complementary, argued
the dissent, for both have a substantial interest in protecting them-
selves and their citizens from sedition. Although the majority found
there was a grave probability state enforcement might hamper or in
some way infringe on the enforcement of federal law, this finding did
not persuade the dissenters, who felt that the assertion was inadequately
supported by the available evidence."8
Unquestionably the dissenters disagreed with every majority con-
tention. Although they were applauded by those interested in promoting
states' rights, the dissenters were engaged in no mere apology for a point
of view. The opinion in which justice Minton joined cannot be so easily
dismissed. As was so often evident in Justice Minton's positions, hard
technical questions lay only partly submerged below his conclusions.
The majority's opinion was fraught with weaknesses. Its quest for
congressional intent seemingly ignored the explicit language found
in the Smith Act; its reliance on the "occupancy of the field" doctrine,
which was developed in another context, labeled the result but con-
cealed the reason for the Court's prior use of the phrase in the commerce
clause cases; its use of the analogy with the labor-management cases
was inapt because those cases were unrelated to the criminal law statutes
at issue in Nelson; and its citation of authority was inadequate to
support the finding of conflict between state enforcement and the ad-
ministration of the federal program. For all of these reasons, the posi-
tion taken by the dissenters, while it need not be accepted, cannot be
cavalierly disregarded.
Even though Justice Minton did not assume the primary responsi-
bility for drafting a dissent in Nelson, Justice Clark has suggested that
the views expressed in justice Reed's dissent were typical of Justice
Minton's general response to constitutional problems involving national
87350 U.S. at 514.




CoMMuNIsm, ADMINISTRATIVE ARBITRA!UNESS, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Loyalty and Citizens
Dennis v. United States,4" the first and lesser-known case involving
the General Secretary of the American Communist Party, Eugene
Dennis, raised questions concerning the right to a fair trial. Dennis
was convicted of willfully refusing to obey a subpoena which had been
served on him by the House Un-American Activities Committee. Seven
government employees sat on the District of Columbia jury which con-
victed him. Dennis contended he had not received a fair trial because
of the inevitable impact the federal loyalty check had on all government
employees. A government employee who voted for the acquittal of a
known Communist would, Dennis argued, put his own reputation in
jeopardy. As Justice Minton wrote in his private papers, Dennis was
"really tried for being a Communist-not for refusing to appear."'"
In an opinion by Justice Minton, the Court refused to presume the
jurors were biased merely because they were government employees.
Bias could not be presumed; it must be actual. Thks distinction should
not go unchallenged. Although jurors sometimes admit actual bias, they
rarely do so. Many challenges to jurors are based on an unarticulated
assumption that, given certain circumstances, there is an unreasonable
risk an accused person will not receive a fair hearing from a particular
juror. Consequently, most challenges are necessarily based on presumed
bias because the factual determination of actual bias is usually impos-
sible."
According to Justice Minton, the lower court's record demonstrated
a willingness to consider any evidence indicating that government
agencies had investigated government employees in retaliation for their
votes to acquit. No convincing evidence of such was advanced by the
petitioner at trial. Nor did the record disclose any widespread appre-
:3 Interview with Justice Tom C. Clark, Aug. 19, 1969.
40339 U.S. 162 (1950).
41 Justice Sherman Minton's file re Dennis v. United States (The Sherman Minton
Papers, The Truman Library).
42 339 U.S. at 172. Justice Minton's conclusion-that the presence of government
employees on the jury did not deny the right of trial by an impartial jury within the
meaning of the sixth amendment-was arguably consistent with tie position taken by the
Court in United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936). There it was argued, on the
authority of Blackstone, that even as the King's servant could not serve on a jury, so
also was a government employee disqualified from jury duty. Chief Justice Hughes'
opinion for the Court took the position that the Commentaries, properly read, did not
support the argument. Id. at 138-39.
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hension among the government employees themselves that a verdict of
acquittal would either endanger their tenure or provoke an investiga-
tion. Justice Minton refused to "take judicial notice of a miasma of
fear to which Government employees are claimed to be peculiarly vul-
nerable . . . ."" The record disclosed nothing which detracted from
the assumption that the "individual integrity by which men judge men"
was exercised by all parties to the verdict.44
The general rule that government employees serving on juries
were not chargeable with implied bias had been stated in United States v.
Wood45 and reaffirmed in Frazier v. United States," over Justice Jack-
son's dissent. The tone of the Jackson opinion in Frazier contrasted
strangely with the communication he sent to Justice T Iinton after read-
ing the Dennis opinion.
I concur in the result. I shall probably need to say a few
words, in view of my dissent in Frazier. But what I say will not
disagree with your reasoning. Maybe if I wait until the dissent is
out I can take care of a few of its points that you would not want
to take a shot at.
You have done a good job and I don't think they can poke
any holes in what you have written.4"
justice Jackson thought it inconceivable that an accused Communist
should be allowed to exclude government employees from a jury when
no other group subject to investigation was accorded a like privilege.
He consequently refused to mitigate the impact of a general rule with
which he totally disagreed. 9
43 339 U.S. at 172.
441d.
45 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
46 335 U.S. 497 (1948).4
7 Recalling Frazier, Jackson later promised that "[w]henever any majority can be
mustered to overrule that wierd and misguided decision, I shall be one of it." Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162, 173 (1950) (concurring opinion).
8Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Sherman Minton, Dec. 15, 1949 (The Sherman
Minton Papers, The Truman Library).49 Justice Jackson's position was not dissimilar from the sentiment expressed in a
letter Justice Minton received from an Indiana attorney.
I have just finished reading your opinion in Dennis v. United States. I be-
lieve it is a good start towards laying to rest a dogma which seems to have had
some strength, that is, that a member of a minority party is entitled not only to
equal rights, but to superior rights. In our zeal to give an unpopular minority
equal rights, we have, or at least some of us have applauded them in their effort
to seek superior rights. Under the facts as set out in your opinion, the Defend-
ant in the Dennis case was clearly guilty of a crime, and to let him off because
he was not granted superior rights in the selection of a jury would seem to me
to be a miscarriage of justice.
Letter from Glenn D. Peters to Sherman Minton, Apr. 18, 1950 (The Sherman Minton
Papers, The Truman Library).
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In two other cases, Cole v. Young5" and Setvice v. Dulles," the
Court severely limited the scope of certain provisl'ons in the National
Security Act52 which permitted summary dismiss-,ls."3 Understood in
the narrowest sense, Cole presented a question of statutory interpreta-
tion. The Act empowered department heads in the federal government
to dismiss civilian employees "in the interest of the national security of
the United States." 4 As passed, the Act was applicable only to those
agencies and departments specified by Congress. However, section 3
of the Act provided that the President could extend the Act to other
agencies and departments when he deemed such action "necessary in the
best interests of national security."5  Acting upon this authority, the
President extended the Act "to all other departments and agencies of
the Government.""6
The meaning of this congressional delegation of power came into
issue when Kendrick M. Cole, an obscure food and drug inspector in
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was suspended from
his post while an investigation of his activities was pending. Allegedly
he associated with Communists and belonged to a subversive organiza-
tion.
The Court's majority understood the Act to be applicable only to
This view did not attract universal approval. Justice Frankfurter circulated a
Memorandum, only part of which was later incorporated in his dissent, which fervently
opposed Justice Jackson's position.
To recognize the existence of what is characterized as a phobia against a
particular group of accused is not to discriminate in its fa- or. If a particular
group, no matter what its belief, is under pressure of popular hostility which is
bound to bear down more heavily upon jurors selected from one section of the
community compared with others, to exclude potential jurors peculiarly suscep-
tible to such pressure, and therefore, subject to bias, is not to pay regard to po-
litical opinions or affiliations but merely to recognize, as law should, the facts of
life. It does not follow that because members of different but respected political
parties can sit in judgment upon one another where punishm nt is involved, that
all members of such parties, no matter what their relation to an operating bias,
can freely and fairly sit in judgment upon those belonging to a despised or ostra-
cized group. It was a wise man who said that there is no greater inequality
than the equality of unequals.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to the Conference, Mar. 24, 1950 (The Sherman Minton
Papers, The Truman Library).
". 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
51354 U.S. 363 (1957). Justice Minton was not on the Supreme Court when this
case was decided.
52 5 U.S.C. §§ 3571, 7531, 7532 (1970).
53 Cole was one of the last cases in which Justice Minton p.articipated. His views
were made explicit in a dissent which he withheld from publication, preferring at the
last moment to concur in Justice Clark's dissent.
64351 U.S. at 538, quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (1970).




those civilian officers and employees in sensitive positions. An employee
could not be dismissed unless he was found to be subversive and em-
ployed in a sensitive position by the federal government. It was the
inclusion of this latter requirement that caused Justice Clark to contend
that the government might thus remain honeycombed with subversives
despite congressional and presidential efforts to be done with them."'
In his unpublished dissent, Justice Minton raised two difficult ques-
tions. First, did Congress intend to restrict the effect of the National
Security Act to sensitive agencies? Second, did the majority's inter-
pretation of the scope of the National Security Act substitute a judicial
determination for a presidential judgment which was contrary to legis-
lative intentions?
I cannot agree that Congress limited the National Security
Act to the so-called sensitive agencies. If it had so intended it
would have stopped with the enumeration of the sensitive agencies.
But it went further and left it to the President's judgment as to
what other agencies the Act should be extended. This was the
President's judgment, not ours, nor that of anyone else. The
Court now says that this Court may tell the President to what
agencies the Act shall be extended. This is substituting our
judgment for that of the President.58
With regard to the first issue, justice Minton attributed to the
Congress a firm determination to remove all subversives from govern-
ment employment. Elsewhere in his dissent he stated:
There is no reason to believe that Congress intended that
disloyal persons were to be free from the provisions of the Act
wherever they were. I do not believe Congress intended that
any place in the Federal Government should be [a] "snug har-
bor" for Communists. If I have understood the purpose and
intention of Congress it was to root out Communists in Govern-
ment as summarily as possible.59
In addition to his fear that the Court's interpretation of the Na-
tional Security Act effectively dredged such a "snug harbor," Justice
Minton was also clearly displeased with what he viewed to lie the
majority's judicial gloss on a presidential decision. Justice Minton felt
that where the President acts in accordance with a legitimate delegation
of congressional power, and the exercise of congressional power is not
57 Id. at 566.
58 Justice Sherman Minton's unpublished dissent, Cole v. Young (The Sherman Min-
ton Papers, The Truman Library).5 Id.
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challenged, presidential discretion may not be countermanded except
when, as exercised, it clearly violates the Constitution. Justice Minton
was not persuaded the President had in this case exceeded his consti-
tutional prerogatives.
In both Dennis and Cole, Justice Minton approved of procedures
which sought to control subversive elements within the federal govern-
ment. Although, as indicated by his file on the Dennis case, he knew
Dennis was prosecuted because he was a Communist, he found no pro-
vision in the Bill of Rights restricting the manner in which the prosecu-
tion was conducted. He neither questioned Congre3s' power to act as it
thought desirable on behalf of national security, nor did he question
the wisdom of congressional action. When he believed Congress had
made its intention clear, he regarded any gloss on that intention by the
judiciary as a usurpation of congressional power. Consequently, con-
gressional prerogatives in matters of national security were not subject
to judicial restrictions.
Loyalty and Aliens
The province of liberty protected by the due process of law is a
region subject to shifting boundaries. With the nation engaged in
World War II, Congress passed legislation permitting the cancellation
of naturalization certificates belonging to those naturalized citizens
whose conduct since the date of their naturalization proceedings indi-
cated that they had not taken the oath of allegian:e in good faith. If
permitted to stand, as drafted such legislation would have put naturalized
citizens under a "whip of administration" not shared by natural born
citizens." In Schneiderman v. United States,1 the equity standard of
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing" proof was adopted in denaturaliza-
tion proceedings and the burden of proof was expressly put upon the
Government. A principal accomplishment of the libertarians on the
Roosevelt Court was to ensure the protection of due process rights
claimed by naturalized citizens.62
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court was also concerned with
the nature of the liberty which could be claimed by those born on
foreign shores. In a series of cases involving the rights of aliens, the
Court explored the due process clause only to determine that it offered
little protection to aliens and none at all to those who were seeking
,60 C. SwisHm, THE GRoWTH OF CONSTrrUTIONAL POWNxR IN THE UNrrr STATES 183
(2d ed. 1963).
01320 U.S. 118 (1943).
62 See C. PmRTcHETT, CIVIn LImETIES AND THE VINsON CotT 102-08 (1954).
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entry into the country. A detailed examination of United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy" illustrates the dynamics of Justice Minton's
approach to some of the problems arising from alienage.
Few cases in the Supreme Court's recent history have attracted as
much attention as did Knauff. The case was decided against the back-
ground of frantic national concern over the detection of alleged Com-
munist sympathizers. Extensive files maintained by the Department of
justice held information allegedly sufficient to prevent the entry of Ellen
Knauff, an alien, into the United States. She was judged undesirable
by the Department of Justice and was accorded neither notice of nor
a hearing on the substance of the charges filed against her. As an alien,
she was not accorded the elementary safeguards of the fifth amendment
guaranteed to all "persons." When she failed to gain admission to the
courts, the Department of Justice took immediate steps to effect her
deportation from the United States.
Justice Jackson Acts
Acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit,
Robert H. Jackson, on May 17, 1950, only minutes before Mrs. Knauff's
scheduled departure, issued an order staying her deportation." Bristling
with indignation, the order reviewed the circumstances which had led
to Mrs. Knauff's application for a stay order that had been denied by
the court of appeals at four o'clock on the previous day.
Soon after the court of appeals had refused Mrs. Knauff's prior
habeas corpus petition, the Department of Justice had made known its
intention to deport Mrs. Knauff on an airplane scheduled to leave New
York City by 11 o'clock the next morning. When Justice Jackson
granted the stay it was his understanding that Mrs. Knauff's deporta-
tion was only minutes away and that preparations for her departure
had already been completed.
Had the Department of justice been allowed to accomplish its pur-
-pose, the Supreme Court would have been without jurisdiction to con-
sider Mrs. Knauff's habeas corpus petition on appeal since she would
-no longer have been within the country.6 Furthermore, an effort
then underway in the Congress to cancel her deportation would have
63 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
64 Robert H. Jackson, Order of May 17, 1950. The Order was circulated to the
-Conference. (The Sherman Minton Papers, The Truman Library.)
5 Compare Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385 uith the present statute, 28 U.S.C. §




been frustrated. Although opposed by the Department of Justice in a
subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, the bill to allow Mrs. Knauff
to remain in the country had been favorably reported and had there-
after been unanimously adopted in the House of Representatives.
Similar legislation had been introduced in the Senate.
The evidence offered by Justice Jackson to support his grave ac-
cusation that the Department of Justice was seeking to avoid the Court's
jurisdiction and frustrate the legislation then pending in Congress was
based on newspaper reports. Although he was ordinarily unwilling to
place principal reliance on journalistic accounts, the suddenness of
events had in this case necessitated his dependence on this source of
information. Justice Jackson was particularly impressed by a remark
appearing in the Baltimore Sun attributed to a government attorney
who, after the court of appeals had suggested an appeal to the Supreme
Court, had allegedly replied, "She may not be here then."6 The New
York Herald Tribune had reported that the government attorney had
predicted that the case would soon be academic since Mrs. Knauff would
be deported by the time any action could be taken. Similarly, the same
attorney had been quoted as saying, "There are no legal impediments
at this time which would prevent her immediate deportation.' 6r
The Department of Justice had at no time given any explanation
for their determination to exclude Mrs. Knauff from the United States.
Despite the shroud of secrecy drawn over the case, Justice Jackson could
not persuade himself that national security would be jeopardized even
infinitesimally if Mrs. Kanuff were allowed to remain in the country for
at least a few additional days. She was, accordingly, permitted sufficient
time to ready her habeas corpus petition for presentation before the
Supreme Court.
Standing the Test of Security
Justice Jackson's prompt action on May 17 preserved the Court's
jurisdiction to hear argument on the effect of this national security
legislation, on which authority the Attorney General had acted. When
the Knauff case was discussed in conference, the vote was four to three
for affirming the Second Circuit's denial of habeas corpus. Justices Clark
and Douglas did not participate. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices
Minton, Burton, and Reed voted to affirm while Justices Jackson,
Frankfurter, and Black voted to reverse. Chief Justice Vinson assigned
16 Order, supra note 64.67id.
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the case to Justice Minton. It was his first civil liberties opinion, and
one of the most celebrated and representative civil liberties opinions
handed down by the Vinson Court.
Justice Minton's opinion in Knauff has been criticized for asking
the wrong question, a question which retained its initial phrasing in all
the preliminary versions of the opinion.68 It was whether the United
States could exclude, without a hearing, the alien wife of a United States
citizen solely upon the recommendation of the Attorney General that
her admission would be prejudicial to the best interest of the United
States. But the real problem may have been how two apparently irrecon-
cilable congressional policies could best be harmonized. The President
had been given extensive power to exclude aliens who were security risks.
A later policy, reflected in the War Brides Act, relaxed strict immigration
policies in favor of war brides whom soldiers had married while over-
seas.
Justice Minton's approach to these conflicting congressional policies
was to resolve the problem into an issue of statutory interpretation. In
effect, he denied that the policies were in conflict by emphasizing a clause
in the War Brides Act which stated that an alien wife, even though
physically or mentally defective, could join her civilian husband "if [she
was] otherwise admissible under the immigration laws."69 This clause
was used by justice Minton to undercut the War Brides Act, since Mrs.
Knauff had already been declared inimical to the best interests of the
United States by the Attorney General.
Two dissents were circulated, one by Justice Frankfurter and
another by Justice Jackson. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, circulated five
days before the Court's decision was handed down, was critical of justice
Minton's approach to the statutory interpretation problem. The re-
moval of the exclusion bar against alien wives and children, even in-
cluding the mentally and physically defective, "was a bounty afforded
by Congress not to the alien . . . but to the citizen who had honorably
served his country." Mrs. Knauff was thought to be at least entitled to
a hearing, for an intense cross-examination of only a few minutes is
sometimes sufficient to dissipate unfounded allegations. justice Frank-
furter regretted that justice Minton had read the War Brides Act in
a literal and decimating spirit. He further feared that the Court's
interpretation made Congress appear to have subjected a nonquota im-
- See Braden, Mr. Justice Minton and the Truman Bloc, 26 IND. L.J. 153, 156-57
(1951).
69 338 U.S. at 546.
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migrant like Mrs. Knauff to the "hazardous gauntlet of an informer's
tale without any opportunity for its refutation."'
Justice Jackson's dissent was extensively critiqued for Justice
Minton by one of his clerks. The criticisms to which Justice Jackson's
dissent was vulnerable indicate both the liabilities of impassioned
rhetoric and the strength of Justice Minton's own tightly reasoned
opinion.
"I do not find that Congress has authorized such abrupt and brutal
exclusion of the wife of an American citizen, whatever it may have
permitted to aliens generally," concluded Justice Jackson. The marginal
comment was: "This does not follow; Jackson nowhere attacks our
conclusion that war brides were to be treated like all aliens as far as
security is concerned.""'
Justice Jackson assumed that "the Army in Germany is not
without a vigilant and security-conscious intelligence service." The
question then put by Justice Minton's clerk was: "How do we know
this? It is not in the record." Justice Jackson further noted: "The
marriage of this woman to an American citizen was approved by the
Commanding General at Frankfurt-on-Main." Thc marginal rejoinder
was: "What inference are we to draw from this? That the military
authorities found Ellen a good security risk? Would such an inference
be justified without proof of the extent of the military's investigations,
et cetera ?,,"2
The Government's position was stated as follows in Justice Jack-
son's dissent:
And the Government tells the Court that not e cen a court can
find out why the girl is excluded. But it says we must find that
Congress authorized this treatment of war brides and even if
we cannot get any reason for it, we must say it :,s legal; security
requires it.
The answer was: "The Government's position is that Congress au-
thorized this treatment not only of war brides, but of all aliens during
the emergency." ''
Thereupon, Justice Jackson drafted one of his most eloquent
passages:
70 Felix Frankfurter to the Conference, Jan. 11, 1950 (The Sherman Minton Papers,
The Truman Library).






Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed
in its name. The menace to the security of this country, be it
great as it may, from this girl's admission is nothing compared
to the menace to free institutions inherent in procedures of this
pattern. In the name of security the police state justifies its
arbitrary oppressions on secret evidence that security will not
allow to be brought to light in hearings. The plea that evidence
of guilt must be secret is abhorent to free men, because it pro-
vides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the corrupt,
and the busy body to play undetected and uncorrected the role
of informer.
To which the clerk replied: "All well and true, but the majority proves
by unquestioned precedent that this has no application to the situation in
this case, that is, an alien seeking the privilege of admission to the United
States."74
A final passage in Justice Jackson's dissent concluded the exchange:
It is enough to say that Congress will have to use more ex-
plicit language than any yet cited before I will agree that it has
authorized an administrative officer to exile an American citizen,
or break up his family, except for serious misconduct. Likewise,
it will have to be much more explicit before I can agree that it
authorized a finding of serious misconduct against the wife of an
American without notice of charges, evidence of guilt and a
chance to meet it.
Again, the clerk's answer denied the validity of the assumption upon
which the dissent proceeded: "As the majority point out, the fact that
Ellen is the wife of an American citizen is no ground of distinction;
she must be treated as any other when seeking admission." '75
In effect, then, Justice Minton's holding was that an alien seeking
admission to this country under the War Brides Act could be excluded
by executive fiat without a hearing. Professor Hart was sufficiently
aroused to declare Justice Minton's assertion that any procedure outlined
by Congress was due process for an alien to be a "patently preposterous
proposition."76
Justice Minton's result may be accepted, however hesitantly, as
a general requirement of national security at a time of cold war hostility
and international suspicion; so also, the status of one seeking admis-
74 Id. Such a view would command little adherence today, of course. On the con-
tinuing validity of the right-privilege distinction, see, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUMIL. CONTR L
OF ADMINISTRATivE AcON 369 (1965).
75 Id.
76 Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Haiv. L. Rzv. 1362, 1392 (1953).
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sion for the first time may be legitimately distinguished from a resident
alien, who is entitled to a minimum protection of procedural due process.
Mrs. Knauff "had to stand the test of security" and this "she failed to
meet."" In the context of the hour, the request was perhaps not
unreasonable, although the risk of monstrous abuse may well be acknowl-
edged.
There was no question about the existence of a clear precedent in
Ekui v. United States," which supported the use of power by the
sovereign to forbid the entrance of aliens. National self-preservation
and the long established custom of international law provided persuasive
justifications for the rule. The Attorney General had sufficient power
to prevent Mrs. Knauff from entering the country, and that alone was
at issue.
Censure and Praise
On Monday, January 23, 1950, Justice Mintort was advised of an
extremely critical editorial appearing in the Chicago Sun-Times. The
editorial contrasted Justice Minton unfavorably with his predecessor,
Wiley B. Rutledge, who had frequently disagreed with the three Justices
concurring with Justice Minton in Knauff: Justices Burton and Reed
and Chief Justice Vinson. Justice Minton posted a letter to the Sun-
Times. Referring first to the editorialist's willingness to contrast his
work with that of Justice Rutledge, Justice Minton wrote, "Where I
line up is not of much importance, but it is important as to whether I
am right in what I decide. That I try to be, irrespective of which line
I get in."'70
He then directed his attention to the charge which had most
annoyed him, the insinuation that the petitioner had "gotten a raw deal."
If so, Minton wrote,
it is something Congress fully authorized. I have always believed
that this Court has no power to legislate, and I certainly believe
it now as strongly as when I fought the old Court because we
thought it was using its power to legislate. I considered it then
and still consider it an usurpation of power to do so.""
A copy of the Court's opinion was enclosed with the letter
in order that you may find the data therein as to the War Brides
77 338 U.S. at 547.
78 142 U.S. 651 (1892).7
" Letter from Sherman Minton to Russell Stewart, Jan. 28, 1950 (The Sherman
Minton Papers, The Truman Library).0 Id.
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Act referred to with such assurance in the editorial as relaxing
immigration restrictions. You will find that we set forth the
War Brides Act and the only four instances in which Congress
relaxed the immigration restrictions. The four provisions never
helled Mrs. Knauff in the least. She was still subject to the rest
of the immigration law as laid down by Congress and the regula-
tions promulgated by the President pursuant to the act of Congress.
It is quite apparent that whoever wrote the editorial had never
seen the opinion.8'
The denouement was promptly forthcoming. The reporter who
had written the offending editorial was told to prepare a memorandum
defending it. The memorandum was sent to Justice Minton along with
a deferential letter from Richard J. Finnegan, editor of the editorial
page. The letter referred to the reporter as a "thoughtful, earnest chap.
. . .who had managed to come up with the idea that the most important
person in the whole proceeding was the soldier, rather than the bride
whom he married."8 There the controversy ended, but Justice Minton
had shown some evidence of sensitivity to public criticism.8
Over a year later, on March 28, 1951, Justice Minton was advised
of an editorial published on that date by the Christian Science Monitor.
The Knauff case was not at an end. After some thirty months on Ellis
Island she had been accorded a hearing where she had been confronted
with the specific charges against her. By unanimous verdict, the Board
of Special Inquiry had officially denied her entry into the country. The
Justice Department's long refusal to disclose the basis for its exclusion
order reflected the Department's continuing effort to protect the sources
of antiespionage information. "The battle for individual liberties,"
concluded the Monitor, "must be fought, more often than not, in behalf
of doubtful cases."8
However, on the following day, March 29, the Board of Special
Inquiry reversed its decision, which was approved on November 1 by the
Attorney General. With the exception of two months, Ellen Knauff had
spent all of her time on Ellis Island since August, 1948. She had, despite
adversity, used her time profitably during this period of detention: in
s1 Id.
82 Letter from Richard J. Finnegan to Sherman Minton, Feb. 7, 1950 (The Sherman
Minton Papers, The Truman Library).
88 Not all reactions to the Knauff opinion were so unfavorable. Apparently Minton
had discussed the case with Senator Richard Russell at lunch shortly after it had been
delivered and had thereafter sent him a complimentary copy. "When it comes to emot-
ing," Senator Russell answered, "I think the dissents are fine, but the opinion of the
majority is much sounder law." Letter from Richard B. Russell to Sherman Minton,
Feb. 7, 1950 (The Sherman Minton Papers, The Truman Library).
84 Chrisatin Science Monitor, Mar. 28, 1951, at 14, col. 2 (central ed.).
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1952 she published her biography, which relates in detail the facts in a
case later characterized by Justice Jackson as "a near miss, saved by
further administrative and congressional hearings from perpetrating an
injustice."8"
Beyond Knauff
A further extension of the principle in Knauff was rejected by the
Court in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding8 over Justice Minton's lone
dissent. In Kwong Hai Chew, the petitioner was a resident of the United
States whereas in Knauff the petitioner had been a nonresident alien.
Minton dissented without opinion, but it seems apparent that he could
not accept the basis for the distinction which the rest of the Court found
persuasive. The petitioner in Kwong Hai Chew, by the majority view,
was entitled to procedural due process under the fifth amendment, which
provided him with the right to notice of the charges against him and
subsequent hearing with an opportunity to confront his accusers."
Relying on Justice Minton's opinion in Knauff, the Court later re-
affirmed, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mczei,8 the view that
a nonresident alien is not entitled to procedural due process. The
Supreme Court's opinion found support in the dissenting opinion by
Judge Learned Hand in the court of appeals. The argument went some-
thing like this: No alien can approach our shores calm with the cer-
tainty of acceptance. There is always the risk of rejection. It makes
no difference that an alien is without a country to which he can return;
it in no way affects his status. Each man must know that, in the event
he is denied permission to come ashore, "he must find an asylum else-
where; or, like the Flying Dutchman, forever sail the seas.""9 The Mezei
decision was much criticized, since it emphasized the limited applica-
tion of Kwong Hai Chew.9" Mezei, although an alien, had resided in
85 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mlezei, 345 U.S. 206, 225 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
so 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
871d. at 596-97.
8 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
89 195 F.2d 964, 971 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J., dissenting).90See ParrcnrHr, supra note 62, at 117-18 (1954). Justice Frankfurter wrote as
follows to Justice Black:
I am writing regarding Bob's dissent in the Mezei case, which I assume you have
seen or will see. He says things that you and I wouldn't say as he says them,
and he says some things that I wouldn't say at all. But as a whole, his opinion
strikes me as a powerful protest against the brutality of reversal in this case.
(I am not saying the majority are brutal. I am saying the rasult of what they
are doing is brutal, needlessly brutal, because this situation is precisely what
habeas corpus is for.) I hope very much Bob will be able to speak for the four
of us. It seems to me that the most effective way for driving home our dissent
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the United States for 28 years. He had left the country for only a
short time to visit his dying mother in Rumania. By so doing he
achieved the status of a nonresident alien. Arguably, Mezei's position
was more similar to an alien subject to deportation proceedings, in view
of his long residence in the country, than to an alien seeking entry for the
first time. Had the case been thus considered, Mezei would have at least
been entitled to procedural due process. As it was, he was entitled to
nothing.
Nonetheless, the statute on which the Court relied was indeed sub-
ject to a geographic interpretation. In a literal sense, Mezei was an
alien, coming from Rumania, seeking entry to the United States. His
entry was barred for reasons of national security. judge Learned Hand
summarized the matter with his customary eloquence:
Think what one may of a statute based upon such fears [of aliens],
when passed by a society which professes to put its faith in the free
interchange of ideas, a court has no warrant for refusing to en-
force it. If that society chooses to flinch when its principles are
put to the test, courts are not set up to give it derringdo.91
CONCLUSION
The great preponderance of the civil liberties cases decided in the
1950's expressed results which justice Minton favored. In confronta-
tions between the government and the individual, he was dependably on
the side of the government, if the government's position represented
an attempted implementation of a legislative decision and if the legis-
lature, in arriving at its decision, had not exceeded the grant of power
delegated to it by the Constitution. Justice Minton, perhaps more than
any other member of the Court, tended to acquiesce in legislative
judgments even when those judgments severely restricted the range of
individual freedom. Consequently, the short term impact of his views
was substantial, for they were, for a little while, the law of the land.
Justice Harlan once said that Justice Minton did not believe in the
incorporation theory, which was first advanced by his grandfather, the
first Justice Harlan. 2 Nor did Justice Minton invoke the notion of due
is to speak with a single voice, particularly when Bob's voice is as charged as
it is with moral indignation and lays bare so effectively the silliness, as well as
the injustice of doing what is being done.
Although Justice Frankfurter joined in Justice Jackson's dissent, Justice Black
elected to file his own dissent, in which Justice Douglas joined. Letter from Felix
Frankfurter to Hugo L. Black, Feb. 19, 1953 (The Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library
of Congress).
9' 195 F.2d at 971.9 2 Interview with Justice John Marshall Harlan, Jan. 30, 1968. Paradoxically, before
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process mechanically in predetermined fact patterns. On the contrary, he
infrequently used due process to invalidate the acts of state govern-
ments. Due process was an ambiguous concept which he identified with
fundamental fairness. Justice Minton's position on the meaning of due
process was not dissimilar from the views expressed by Justice Cardozo"
and Justice Frankfurter. 4 With reference to a state case, he commented
his nomination Judge Minton had endorsed Justice Black's theory of total incorporation
of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the fourttenth amendment, during
the course of a book review for the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL. Minton, Book Review, 24
IND. L.J. 299, 302 (1949).
93 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
94See the opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Black in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947). Long before the clash of ideas in Adamson, Justice Frankfurter had
carefully articulated his position. The following letter clearly indicates the nature of
his commitments:
For nearly twenty years I was at work on what was to be as comprehensive and
as scholarly a book on the Fourteenth Amendment as I could make it. That
book was aborted when I came down here, and now there is nothing to show for
those twenty years except the poor things in my head and a mass of largely
illegible notes. But my sense of the importance of the relation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the development of the democratic process in this coun-
try has certainly not abated since coming here. And so, I v. ill trouble you with
spelling out a little bit more closely than I had a chance ye ;terday the problem
which concerns us both so very much.
1. Beginning with the first consideration by this Court of the reach and mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment-I mean of course the Slaughterhouse Cases
-successive Courts have divided.
2. So long as the Fourteenth Amendment is part of our Constitution it seems
to me unjustifiable to hope that fluctuating divisions about its scope will not con-
tinue in the future as they have in the last seventy years, 3o long as the due
process clause is given more than a procedural content.
3. Once you go beyond a procedural content and pour into the generality of the
language substantive guaranties, it is to me inconceivable that any kind of defi-
nition of the substantive rights of the guaranty will not repeat in the future the
history of the past, namely will according to the makeup of the Court give vary-
ing scope to the substantive rights that are protected-and so I spent practically
my mature lifetime, until I came on the Court, in adding my feeble efforts to-
ward maintaining a conscientious observance by the Court -f what I conceive
to be the very narrow scope of the Court's power to strike down political action.
My starting point is, of course, the democratic faith on which this country is
founded-the right of the democracy to make mistakes and correct its errors by
the organs that reflect the popular will-which regards the Court as a qualifica-
tion of the democratic principle and desires to restrict the plky of this undemo-
cratic feature to its narrowest limits. I am aware that men who have power can
exercise it-and too often do-to enforce their own will, to make their will, or if
you like their notions of policy, the measure of what is right. But I am also
aware of the forces of tradition and the habits of discipline whereby men en-
trusted with power remain within the limited framework of their professed
power. fore particularly, the history of this Court emboldens me to believe that
men need not be supermen to observe the conditions under which judicial review
of political authority-that's what judicial review of legislation really amounts
to-is ultimately maintainable in a democratic society. When men who had such
background and such relation to so-called property interests a . did, for instance,
Waite, Bradley, Moody, Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo, showed how scrupu-
lously they did not write their private notions of policy into the Constitution,
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on the nature of due process:
As in all cases involving what is or is not due process, so in
this case, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The pattern of
due process is picked out in the facts and circumstances of each
case. The pattern here, long in use in North Carolina, does not
deny the fundamental essentials of a trial, "the very essence of a
scheme of ordered justice," which is due process 5
The impact of Justice Minton's long term contributions to con-
stitutional development in the area of civil liberties has been less
then I am not prepared to say that all that a court does when it adjudicates in
these constitutional controversies is an elaborate pretense, and that judges do in
fact merely translate their private convictions into decisions and call it the law
and the Constitution.
I appreciate the frailties of men, but the War is for me meaningless and Hitler
becomes the true prophet if there is no such thing as law different from and be-
yond the individuals who give it expression. And what I am thinking about is
that if each temporary majority on this Court-and none is very long-in fact
merely regards its presence on this Court as an opportunity for translating its
own private notions of policy into decisions, the sooner an educated public
opinion becomes aware of the fact the better not only for truth but also in the
true interests of democracy. For myself I think the years that are ahead make
more and not less important the tribunal for which the wise founders of this
ountry provided, acting however within the very narrow limits within which
it was deemed appropriate that it should function.
4. As I understand it, you find restrictions against the exercise of unbridled
power by fluctuating majorities on this Court, so far as the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is concerned, in what you deem to be the specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights. I should be very happy to be able to tie down by specific provisions that
would bind them judges who, for one reason or another, are not so disciplined
as were Waite and Bradley and Holmes-assuming that what I call dialectics,
namely the resourcefulness of interpretation, does not give room for the widest
variants in the interpretation even of specific provisions. But I am truly eager
for understanding this matter, and therefore should be grateful to you if you
will refer me to the materials which justify one in saying that the general
language of the Fourteenth Amendment was in fact a compendious statement
of some or all of the earlier first nine Amendments. Are all nine so incor-
porated? Did the Fourteenth Amendment establish uniform systems of judicial
procedure in all the states and freeze them for the future, both in criminal and
in civil cases, to the extent that the Constitution does for federal courts? Is it
conceivable that an amendment bringing about such a result would either have
been submitted to the states, or, if submitted, would have been ratified by them?
And if not all the nine Amendments, which of the prior nine Amendments are to
be deemed incorporated and which left out?
5. Believe me that in writing this nothing is farther from my purpose than
contention. I am merely trying to get light on a subject which has absorbed as
much thought and energy of my mature life as anything that has concerned me.
I ask you quite humbly to lead me to the materials that show that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated by reference the provisions-any or all--of the earlier
nine amendments.
Needless to say there is no hurry about this. Whenever you feel inclined to
help educate me, I shall be grateful.
Felix Frankfurter to Hugo L. Black, Nov. 13, 1943 (The Felix Frankfurter Papers,
Library of Congress).95 Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1953).
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favorably assessed. C. Herman Pritchett has argued that
what the Vinson majority frequently failed to exhibit [was] a warm
humanitarian sympathy, a conviction that libertarian values are
tremendously important, an insistence that the Court use the full
measure of its legitimate power to compel adherence to procedural
safeguards, and a tough-minded scrutiny of the plausible rational-
izations which are always available to explain away infringements
of human liberty9 6
If the criticism seems uncomfortably harsh, perhaps it can be somewhat
tempered by recalling what Judge Learned Hand once noted privately to
Justice Frankfurter: "So much of what we do is not a case of barbara
celarent anyway; but of more or less."9 7 Cases before the Supreme
Court were not there because they admitted of only one possible answer.
It was, instead, always a question of "more or less" in holding the
delicate balance between the social interest in individual freedom and the
social interest in the general security.
96 PRITcrrM, supra note 62, at 238.
07 Letter from Learned Hand to Felix Frankfurter, Mar. 30, 1949 (The Felix
Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress).
1974]
